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Abstract—Dataflow tracking with Dynamic
Taint Analysis (DTA) is an important method in
systems security with many applications, including
exploit analysis, guided fuzzing, and side-channel
information leak detection. However, DTA is
fundamentally limited by the boolean nature of
taint labels, which provide no information about
the significance of detected dataflows and lead to
false positives/negatives on complex real world
programs.
We introduce proximal gradient analysis (PGA),
a novel theoretically grounded approach that can
track more accurate and fine-grained dataflow in-
formation than dynamic taint analysis. We observe
that the gradients of neural networks precisely
track dataflow and have been used widely for dif-
ferent data-flow-guided tasks like generating adver-
sarial inputs and interpreting their decisions. How-
ever, programs, unlike neural networks, contain
many discontinuous operations for which gradients
cannot be computed. Our key insight is that we
can efficiently approximate gradients over discon-
tinuous operations by computing proximal gradi-
ents, a mathematically rigorous generalization of
gradients for discontinuous functions. Proximal gra-
dients allow us to apply the chain rule of calculus to
accurately compose and propagate gradients over
a program with minimal error.
We compare our prototype PGA implementation
to two state of the art DTA implementations,
DataFlowSanitizer and libdft, on 7 real-world pro-
grams. Our results show that PGA can improve
the F1 accuracy of data flow tracking by up to
33% over taint tracking without introducing any
significant overhead (<5% on average). We further
demonstrate the effectiveness of PGA by discover-
ing 23 previously unknown security vulnerabilities
and 2 side-channel leaks, and analyzing 9 existing
CVEs in the tested programs.
I. Introduction
Dataflow analysis with dynamic taint analysis (DTA)
is a fundamental building block in many common
systems security tasks, such as automated vulnerability
analysis, guided fuzzing, discovering information leaks,
and malware analysis [13], [40], [19], [37], [3], [52]. DTA
analyzes dataflow between a specified set of sources and
sinks in a program either statically, by analyzing the
source code or binary, or dynamically, by instrumenting
the program and tracking taint as it executes [33], [30].
All existing DTA techniques propagate dataflow
information based on a set of rules for every executed
operation. The final taint results are computed by
propagating and composing the per-statement taint
rules together. However, DTA is fundamentally limited
by the boolean information contained in taint labels:
data either is tainted by a given source or not, there are
no intermediate states or other sources of information.
This means there is no way to identify and prioritize
which dataflows are most significant, or quantify what
effect changing the values of the taint sources will
have on the program. Moreover, it limits the ability of
DTA frameworks to account for dataflows that cancel
out over multiple operations. Detecting all possible
canceling dataflows is extremely difficult in practice
and they often result in false positives. For example,
while most DTA frameworks may have a special case
to avoid propagating incorrect taints for operations
like y = x1 - x1; , they may not be able to correctly
handle a sequence of operations like x1 = *ptr; x2
= *ptr; y = x1 - x2;. As observed by Slowinska et
al. [45], [46], false positives caused by these types of
errors have prevented DTA from being successfully
applied for detecting keyloggers and certain memory
corruption attacks.
The limitations of DTA have long been recognized in
the community and led several researchers to propose
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taint	source:	x1,	x2,	x3
taint	sink:	y
//	input:	x1,	x2,	x3	=	10
int	y	=	x1	+	x2*x2	-	100*x3;
if	(y	>	THRESH)	{
				//	vulnerability
}
y	Taint
1 1 1
y	Gradient
x1 x2 x3
x1 x2 x3
1 20
-100
Fig. 1: Example program in which gradient can
guide a search to reach a vulnerability. While taint
tracking identifies y as tainted by all three inputs,
gradient measures the magnitude and direction of
each influence, identifying that x3 is the most influ-
ential input and that minimizing it will maximize
y due to its negative gradient.
influence as a more fine grained form of dataflow,
where influence measures the extent to which the inputs
to each operation effect its output. This approach
is based on Quantitative Information Flow (QIF)
and uses channel capacity to measure influence [32].
However, while QIF is able to track data more precisely
using information measures such as channel capacity,
computing these measures is a fundamentally difficult
problem that limits the scalability of these approaches
[26].
In this paper, we propose an alternate measure of
influence inspired by the fields of machine learning and
continuous optimization that addresses the limitations
of DTA while retaining its advantages in scalability. We
observe that gradient, a multi-variate generalization
of derivatives from elementary calculus, is a popular
method for tracking the influence of inputs on outputs
through differentiable models [15]. In particular,
gradients have been used with neural networks to
perform a variety of tasks that are analogous to the
applications of DTA in program analysis, including
generating inputs to trigger errors, explaining output
behaviors, and maximizing test coverage [4], [44], [43],
[20], [36]. In these applications, gradients serve as a
measure for how inputs to a differentiable model affect
its output, making it possible to explain a model’s
observed behavior, or generate new inputs that alter
the behavior.
The additional information provided by gradients
confer two crucial advantages: (i) Fine-grained
tracking. Gradients measure both the magnitude and
direction of influence, which indicate how changes to
an operations input will effect its output. This means
gradients can be used to identify which marked sources
are most influential, and how they will effect program
behavior. This is illustrated in Figure 1, in which
the magnitude of the gradient identifies the most
influential of three inputs, and the direction of the
gradient indicates how that input can be changed to
reach a vulnerability. (ii) Precise composition. Due
to the additional magnitude and direction information
they incorporate, gradients compose precisely over
multiple differentiable operations (e.g., floating point
arithmetic) without introducing any inaccuracies due
to the chain rule of calculus [49]. For x1 = *ptr; x2
= *ptr; y = x1 - x2; the gradients of x1 and x2
will cancel out due to the subtraction, resulting in a
gradient of 0 for y, correctly indicating that there is
no dataflow.
However, in general, programs contain many discrete
operations with different types of non-smooth behav-
ior (i.e., bitwise operations, integer arithmetic, and
branches as shown in Figure 2) that cannot be differ-
entiated directly. These non-differentiable operations
break the chain rule and prevent the gradient from
being composed accurately. In this paper, we build
on the rich non-smooth calculus literature to define
generalized gradients for programs that satisfy weaker
forms of chain rule [48], [21], [31]. We observe that
most operations performed by real-world hardware
share a property called Lipschitz continuity due to the
finite bit-width of the operands. Lipschitz continuity
enforces that the output of a function will not change
too drastically as long as the input changes are
small (see Section II for a more formal definition).
Therefore, in this paper, we use proximal gradients,
a type of gradient approximation particularly suited
for Lipschitz continuous functions, which convert the
problem of computing the gradient to finding the
local minima for a non-differentiable operation [35].
Proximal gradients provide a theoretically grounded
framework for gradient evaluation that allows us to
precisely track dataflow across real-world programs
with minimal compositional errors.
We implement a prototype of Proximal Gradient
Analysis (PGA) as an LLVM pass that instruments
programs during compilation to compute and propa-
gate proximal gradients. We compare the results of
PGA to those of DataFlowSanitizer, LLVM’s state-
of-the-art DTA implementation, on 7 widely used
applications and show that PGA achieves up to 33%
better F1 accuracy than DataFlowSanitizer without
incurring any significant (<5%) extra overhead. We
further compare the usefulness of PGA by applying it
to gradient-guided fuzzing and show that using PGA
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Fig. 2: Different types of discrete and discontinuous operations that occur in real-world programs
achieves up to 56% higher edge coverage than DTA
and improves the rate of new edge discovery by 10%
on average. Finally, we demonstrate PGA’s usefulness
by using it to discover 23 previously unknown security
vulnerabilities and 2 side-channel leaks, and analyzing
9 existing CVEs in our tested programs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First,
Section II summarizes the background on different
generalizations of gradients to non-smooth analysis
including proximal gradients. Next, we describe our
methodology for computing proximal gradients on real-
world programs in Section III. We describe the details
of our implementation of proximal gradient analysis
in Section IV, and Section V contains the details of
our experimental setup and detailed results. Finally,
we summarize related work in section VI and conclude
in section VII.
Our main contributions are:
1) We are the first, to the best of our knowledge, to
use non-smooth analysis for dataflow tracking in
real-world programs. Specifically, we design, im-
plement, and evaluate Proximal Gradient Analysis
(PGA), a novel, theoretically grounded technique
for measuring fine grained influence with minimal
errors in real-world programs.
2) We implement our PGA framework for automati-
cally computing and tracking proximal gradients
as an LLVM Pass. We are currently working on
making our code available as open-source software.
3) We perform extensive experimental evaluation of
PGA and compare it to two state of the art
DTA implementations, DataFlowSanitizer and
libdft, on 7 popular, real-world programs. Our
experimental results show that PGA achieves up
to 33% higher F1 accuracy than DTA without
introducing significant additional overhead (on
average <5%). PGA also achieves up to 56%
improvement in new edge coverage relative to
DTA for data-flow-guided fuzzing of our tested
programs.
4) We demonstrate that PGA’s fine-grained tracking
is helpful for finding and analyzing different types
of security vulnerabilities. In our experiments,
PGA found 23 previously unknown bugs and 2
side-channel leaks in our tested programs. PGA
also detected the exploitable dataflow in 9 known
CVEs including 3 where DTA fails.
II. Background
Our approach to gradient-based dataflow analysis
draws on several techniques from the mathematical
analysis and optimization literature. We provide a
summary of the relevant methods below.
A. Smooth Analysis
Gradients. The derivative for a smooth scalar func-
tion f(x) is defined as f ′(x) = lim
δx→0
f(x+δx)−f(x)
δx .
The gradient is a generalization of the derivative to
multi-variate functions that can be understood as
the slope of the function at the point where it is
evaluated. The directional derivative evaluates the
gradient in a specific direction; formally, it is defined as
Dvf(x) = lim
h→0
f(x+hv)−f(x)
h , where v is the direction
of the derivative and x is the point at which it is
evaluated.
Chain Rule. Gradients over differentiable functions
have the useful property that gradients of compositions
of functions can be computed precisely from the
gradients of the individual functions. This is known
as the chain rule of calculus and is defined as follows
where ◦ indicates the composition of two functions f
and g and f ′ and g′ are their respective gradients.
(f ◦ g)′ = (f ′ ◦ g) · g′ (1)
Automatic Differentiation. Gradients of functions
which have no analytical form but are composed of
many simple and analytically differentiable functions
are usually computed with a process called Automatic
Differentiation (AutoDiff). Autodiff uses the chain
rule to compute the gradient over a program as a
series of gradients of individual operations multiplied
together, each of which can be computed analytically.
Autodiff has been a longstanding tool in computational
modeling and is a core component of deep learning
frameworks such as Tensorflow [49], [1]. However,
existing AutoDiff methods and frameworks are limited
to working with mostly continuous functions with
limited discontinuity (e.g., ReLUs in neural networks).
B. Non-smooth Analysis
Extensive work has been done in the field of mathe-
matical analysis on different methods for approximat-
ing gradients over discrete and non-smooth functions.
The exact type of approximation depends on the nature
of the underlying function. We describe two major
subclasses of non-smooth functions below that are
most relevant to our work.
Lipschitz Continuity. A function is intuitively Lips-
chitz Continuous if its output does not change too much
for small changes in the input. Formally, a function f
is Lipschitz Continuous if for all pairs of points x1 and
x2 in the domain of f the following property holds:
|f (x1)− f (x2) | ≤ K|x1 − x2| (2)
Figure 3b shows a simple Lipschitz continuous function
along with the corresponding Lipschitz constant. All
useful functions that can be computed in reasonable
time by a computer are Lipschitz continuous due to the
finite bit widths of intermediate computation, although
the Lipschitz constant may become very large for some
operations.
Convexity. Intuitively, a function is convex if the
straight line connecting any two points on the graph of
the function lies entirely above or on the surface of the
function. Figure 3a shows a simple convex function.
More formally, a function f is called convex if the
following property is satisfied by all pairs of points x
and y in its domain: f(tx+ (1− t)y) ≥ tf(x) + (1−
t)f(y),∀t ∈ [0, 1].
All convex functions are locally (i.e., over some
interval of their domain) Lipschitz continuous but the
converse is not true. While operations like addition
and multiplication, or multiplying a variable by itself,
are convex, bitwise operations and discontinuities
from branching in computer programs are generally
not convex. Therefore, programs in general are not
convex, although they may be convex over many local
neighborhoods.
For convex non-smooth functions, subgradients are
a popular approach for approximating gradients that
have several desirable composition and global conver-
gence properties as described below. For nonconvex
functions, an extension of subgradients called gener-
alized gradients may be used that allow optimization
to still be performed, albeit with further relaxed
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Fig. 3: Classes of functions
composition and convergence properties [12], [39]. We
summarize both of these approaches below.
Subgradients. For convex non-smooth functions, sub-
gradients present a generalization of gradients that
follows the chain rule [5]. A subgradient of a convex
function at a point is a vector that only intersects
the function at that point. Formally, a vector v is a
subgradient of a function f at a point x if:
f (y) ≥ f (x) + v · (y − x) for all y ∈ dom (f) (3)
Intuitively, this means that the vector v either
touches or is less than the function f for all points
on f . The dot product v · (y − x) projects points
along the subgradient v. Unlike gradients, which tend
to be unique for a given point on a function, there
can be multiple valid subgradients for a given point
of a discrete convex function, as shown in Figure 4a.
Subgradients follow the chain rule and therefore can be
efficiently computed over complex composite functions.
Generalized Gradients. Non-convex functions (e.g.,
y = x%4 in Figure 2) may have points where no
valid subgradient exists. For such non-convex but
locally Lipschitz functions, generalized gradients are
used to approximate gradients [12], [39]. Generalized
gradients consist of generalized directional derivatives,
which work like subgradients, but only project in a
single direction, starting at the point where they are
evaluated and always remaining under the function,
much as ordinary directional derivatives operate on
smooth functions. Generalized directional derivatives
can be computed even at points where there is no valid
subgradient as shown in Figure 4b.
A generalized directional derivative in a direction v
is denoted by f◦ (x;v), which is defined as follows:
f◦ (x;v) = lim sup
y→x,λ↓0
f (y + λv)− f (y)
λ
(4)
Here x is the point at which the generalized derivative
is evaluated, y can be any other point in the domain
of f , and λ is a distance along the vector v that
the derivative is taken in. The lim supy→x notation
indicates that the generalized derivative takes on the
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Fig. 4: Examples of subgradients of a convex func-
tion and generalized directional derivatives of a
non-convex function
largest possible value for the two points y and y + λv
closest to x in the function’s domain. The generalized
gradient at a given point is defined as the set of
all generalized directional derivatives for all possible
directions from that point.
The chain rule only applies to generalized deriva-
tives when the composing upper-level functions are
monotonic. However, different relaxed versions of the
chain rule apply to generalized gradients under different
weaker assumptions on the components of composite
functions [48], [21], [31].
Proximal Gradients. While generalized gradients
are powerful theoretical guides to the analysis of
non-smooth, non-convex functions, they cannot be
evaluated efficiently on general functions. To make their
evaluation tractable, we use an alternative technique
called proximal gradients [35]. Instead of combining
every possible surface or supporting vector under a
function like subgradients and generalized gradients,
proximal gradients use the local minima of a function
within a nearby region to define an approximate
gradient. This vector will still define a valid subgradient
or generalized derivative depending on whether the
function is convex or non-convex.
The local minimization problem of the proximal
gradient is defined by a cost function that increases
quadratically with the distance from the evaluation
point. By representing the gradient with a single vector
and bounding the region in which it is evaluated,
the proximal gradient makes the general problem of
evaluating gradients on non-smooth functions tractable.
The proximal gradient uses a special operator (called
the proximal operator) to perform its local minimiza-
tion. The proximal operator is defined as follows when
evaluated on a given point x, where || · ||2 denotes the
Euclidean distance:
proxf (x) = argminy
(
f (y) + 12 ||x− y||22
)
(5)
The notation argminy indicates that the operator
selects the value of y that minimizes both the value
of function f (y) and the distance cost
(1
2
) ||x − y||22.
Evaluating the proximal operator will give the min-
imum point near x. This point can then be used to
compute the largest directional gradient in the region
near the point.
prox∇f (x) =
f (x)− f (proxf (x))
x− proxf (x) (6)
One of the key advantages of proximal gradients is
that even in the non-convex and non-smooth case, the
accuracy of the gradient computation usually increases
with more samples from the bounded region. For
the convex case, proximal gradients provide strong
convergence guarantees.
III. Methodology
At a high level, our gradient propagation frame-
work, PGA, is similar to Autodiff, computing the
gradient of each operation and using the results as
inputs to the next gradient computation. However,
unlike Autodiff, we approximate the gradients of non-
smooth functions with their proximal gradients. The
accuracy of the proximal gradients for non-smooth,
non-convex operations depend on the sampling rate
and the underlying function’s local Lipschitz constants.
As noted in Section II, all practical programs are
composed of Lipschitz continuous operations. For more
precise approximations of local Lipschitz constants of
different operations, we propagate them throughout
the program execution trace along with the gradient.
A. Principled Program Gradient Evaluation
To compute gradients over programs with PGA,
we model a program as an arbitrary function P that
transforms the system state from x to x′. Since the
program P usually is composed of simple individual
operations, we model P as a composition of N individ-
ual simple functions on the system state that represent
each operation in the program:
P (x) = PN ◦ PN−1 ◦ · · · ◦ P2 ◦ P1(x)
Since these operations, in general, are not differen-
tiable, we apply proximal gradients to compute an
approximated gradient over each operation ∇subP (x).
This, by definition, results in a valid subgradient on
convex operations and a valid generalized gradient on
operations that are non-convex. We then apply the
chain rule to estimate the overall program gradient as
a product of the individual proximal gradients.
x = 7 x = 7
(a) Proximal cost
x = 7 x = 7
(b) Proximal gradient
Fig. 5: An example of proximal gradient evaluation
at x = 7
∇subP (x) =
∇subPN ∗ ∇subPN−1 ∗ · · · ∗ ∇subP2 ∗ ∇subP1
This is the same approach used in Automatic
Differentiation, but generalized to discrete functions
and proximal gradients. Importantly, this chained
gradient approximation is designed to be error-free
for all locally Lipschitz convex functions as well
as some locally Lipschitz non-convex functions that
meet the requirements for the non-smooth chain rule
(e.g., monotonicity). Moreover, even on non-convex
operations where the non-smooth chain rule does not
hold, as mentioned in Section II, we can still minimize
error by increasing the number of samples.
Bounded Proximal Gradient. To guarantee that a
proximal gradient is computed correctly, the region
in which the local minima may occur must be fully
sampled. We derive an exact bound for this region
based on the function’s Lipschitz Constant K.
||proxf (x)− x||2 ≤ 2K (7)
We use this bound to define the bounded proximal
gradient, prox∇f (x,K), which takes the Lipschitz
Constant of the function as a second input and samples
within the bounded region. A full derivation of the
bound and definition of the bounded proximal gradient
are provided in Appendix A.
Figure 2 gives a concrete example of evaluating the
bounded proximal gradient. The bitwise function in the
example, x & 4, has a Lipschitz Constant of K = 4,
so the sampling distance bound is 2K = 8. Figure 5a
shows the value of the cost function near x = 7. There
is a clear minimum at x = 8, so the proximal gradient
is evaluated as prox∇f (7) = f(7)−f(8)7−8 = −4 as shown
figure 5b.
B. Gradient Propagation Rules
Our approach to approximating gradients on pro-
grams with minimal error requires that both the gradi-
ent itself and the Lipschitz Constant of each operation
f is propagated as Kf . For most operations we define
specific rules for updating theKf , but in some cases the
Lipschitz constant cannot be determined analytically.
In these cases, we estimateKf by sampling the function
based on the input xi and its Lipschitz Constant,
xi ±Ki, and taking the maximum difference.
We organize the propagation rules for program
operations into four categories based on their behavior:
floating point operations, integer operations, load and
store operations, and branching operations.
Floating Point Operations. Floating point opera-
tions are handled analytically using standard forward
auto-differentiation methods and the chain rule [22].
Integer Operations. Unlike floating point operations,
integer operations exhibit a variety of behaviors that
require special handling. Some functions are convex
with analytical solutions, while some non-smooth
functions have well-defined behavior that makes it
possible to derive specific rules to update Lipschitz
Constants.
Addition, multiplication, and subtraction are relaxed
to their corresponding continuous functions (i.e. float-
ing point operations) then handled analytically.
For non-smooth integer operations, we define the
following special cases for determining Lipschitz Con-
stants.
1) Modulo Operations. In cases where the modulo
operand is constant, the Lipschitz Constant for
the modulo function is simply the modulo operand
(i.e. right hand operand).
2) Shift Operations. When the shift operand (i.e.
the right hand operand) is constant, the Lipschitz
constant be determined by raising 2 to the operand
value and applying chain rule.
3) Bitwise Operations. When one of the operands
of a bitwise operation is a constant, or at least
has a 0 derivative with regard the marked input,
the Lipschitz Constant can be set the value of the
highest set bit in the constant operand.
4) Integer Division. To compute the Lipschitz
Constant on integer division, we use the quotient
rule and consider the case that causes the maxi-
mum possible change in f , where dgdxi = Kg, and
dh
dxi
= −Kh.
In cases where any one of these nonsmooth oper-
ations have a non-constant operand, we apply the
sampling procedure defined above in order to estimate
sampling bounds for the proximal gradient.
External library functions. External library func-
tion calls without source code access can be modeled
y = 2 * x  
y_shad = alloc_shadow() 
y_grad = gradient(2 * x)  
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Memory
Instrumentation Code 
Fig. 6: GRSan architecture illustrating how gradients
are propagated.
as arbitrary nonsmooth functions f (g). Since we
cannot derive the Lipschitz Constant Kf as we do
not know the inner details of the function, we estimate
it by sampling the function at g ± g′ and taking the
maximum difference.
Load and Store Operations. Gradients on store
operations are dispersed to each byte used to store the
variable in memory, and the corresponding gradients on
load operations are aggregated to compute the gradient
of the result. When a loaded value is more than a
byte in width, the gradient and Lipschitz constant
associated with each byte in memory is left shifted
according to its offset and summed together. Similarly,
when a value of more than a byte is stored, the gradient
and Lipschitz constant of the value are right shifted
and stored.
Branches. In our current prototype implementation
we do not take branches into account and simply
propagate gradients along the current execution path.
However, for completeness, we describe two possible ap-
proaches to handling branches with PGA in Appendix
B.
IV. Implementation
We implement PGA as a new sanitizer in the LLVM
framework [27] called Gradient Sanitizer (GRSan). We
use LLVM because it allows us to instrument a program
during compilation after it has been converted to
LLVM’s intermediate representation. This means that
GRSan can be used to instrument any program written
in a language supported by LLVM and reduces runtime
overhead due to our compile-time instrumentation.
Overall Architecture. We base GRSan on LLVM’s
taint tracking implementation, DataFlowSanitizer.
DataFlowSanitizer uses shadow memory to track taint
labels. For each byte of application memory, there
are two corresponding bytes of shadow memory that
store the taint label for that byte. At compile time,
DataFlowSanitizer instruments the original program
with additional instructions that update the taint
information in the shadow memory.
We modify DataFlowSanitizer in the following two
ways: First, we add additional metadata associated
with each label that is used to store the gradient
information in a gradient table as shown in Figure 6.
Second, we change the dataflow propagation rules
to compute gradients over each operation. Figure 6
gives an example of how the instrumentations for
propagation rules work. Given an operation y=2*x,
the instrumentation first allocates space in the shadow
memory and gradient table for y. The instrumentation
then computes the derivative of 2*x and stores it in
the corresponding gradient table entry.
Gradient Propagation Rules. When a differen-
tiable binary operator such as multiplication instruc-
tion is visited, GRSan uses the chain rule to update the
gradients. For nondifferentiable binary operators such
as the binary And operator, GRSan approximates the
proximal operator and Lipschitz Constant by sampling
based on the input gradient and taking the closest
nonzero sampled gradient. In practice, we found this
approximation picked the same values that the prox-
imal operator would select and was computationally
lighter (i.e. does not require computing exponents). A
code sample of gradient instrumentation for Mul and
And operations is provided in Appendix C.
We leave most external function calls uninstru-
mented, but some operations in glibc are given
special instrumentation. We set the gradients for any
buffer overwritten by fread or memset to 0, and the
gradients of buffers copied by memcpy or strcpy are
also copied. Type casting instructions are handled by
simply copying labels from the original value to the
result.
V. Evaluation
We evaluate PGA by comparing its performance
directly to DTA, and in direct applications for vul-
nerability detection and analysis. Specifically, we run
experiments to answer the following questions:
1) Is PGA more precise than DTA in tracking
dataflows?
2) How does the overhead introduced by PGA com-
pare to DTA?
3) Does using PGA to guide fuzzing lead to better
edge coverage?
Library Test Command SLOC File Format
zlib-1.2.11 minigzip -d 3228 GZ/ZIP
libjpeg-9c djpeg 8,857 JPEG
mupdf-1.14.0 mutool show 123,562 PDF
libxml2-2.9.7 xmllint 73,920 XML
binutils-2.30 objdump -xD 72,955 ELF
strip 56,330
size 52,991 ELF
TABLE I: Test programs used in our evaluation.
4) Can PGA detect and analyze recent CVEs that
taint is typically used to detect?
5) Is PGA an effective tool for vulnerability discov-
ery?
6) Can PGA detect and analyze memory and timing-
based information leaks?
A. Experimental Setup
Test Programs. We perform tests on a set of 5 widely
used file parsing libraries and 7 total programs. We use
file parsers because these programs often must process
files from untrusted sources, making them a common
target for attacks. Table I shows the test programs
and SLOC associated with each executable tested. In
total the programs have 391,883 SLOC.
Test Environment. All of our evaluations are per-
formed on an Ubuntu 16.04 server with an Intel Xeon
E5-2623 v4 2.60GHz CPU and 192G of memory.
B. Performance
We first evaluate the performance of PGA as a tool
for dynamic dataflow analysis. In our experiments, we
compare PGA to DataFlowSanitizer, LLVM’s state-
of-the-art DTA implementation. Since our implemen-
tation of PGA is based on the DataFlowSanitizer
architecture, our setup ensures that any differences
in performance between PGA and DTA are to due the
respective performance of gradient and taint and not
due to differences in the underlying architectures.
We compare performance in three areas: first, we
estimate the accuracy of the dataflows predicted by
PGA and DTA. Second, we evaluate the overhead
introduced by the PGA instrumentation. Third, we
compare the edge coverage achieved by a dataflow-
guided fuzzer using either PGA or DTA to guide its
mutation strategy.
1) Dataflow Accuracy: We evaluate the accuracy
of PGA in comparison to DTA against an estimate
of ground truth dataflows. This comparison setting
libdft dfsan grsan
Prec. Rec. F1 Prec. Rec. F1 Prec. Rec. F1
minigzip 0.42 0.29 0.17 0.29 0.60 0.39 0.63 0.51 0.57
djpeg - - - 0.22 1.00 0.37 0.60 0.83 0.69
mutool 0.70 0.32 0.22 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.86 0.51 0.64
xmllint - - - 0.62 0.99 0.76 0.94 0.91 0.92
objdump 0.47 0.67 0.28 0.37 0.93 0.52 0.66 0.77 0.71
strip 0.26 0.59 0.18 0.20 0.96 0.33 0.50 0.86 0.63
size 0.20 0.59 0.30 0.37 0.95 0.53 0.62 0.91 0.74
TABLE II: Summary of accuracy comparison results
for taint and gradient analysis. Best F1 scores for
each program are highlighted. Experiments with
Libdft on djpeg and xmllint timed out after 24hrs.
PGA outperforms DTA on all programs.
favors DTA since it does not take the fine grained
dataflow information from taint into account (i.e., only
considers binary 0/1 influence), but still illustrates the
benefits of PGA’s increased precision. In addition to
comparing against DFSan, which we consider a fair
comparison since both systems are based on LLVM,
we also compare against libdft, which is another
widely used DTA framework. Libdft uses Intel PIN to
instrument the binary directly, and therefore requires
running a parallel experiment in which ground truth
dataflows are also estimated separately using PIN
instrumentation.
Ground truth estimation. We first estimate ground
truth for each potential dataflow. We record the value
of the source and sink variable for a single execution
and then modify the value of source variable and
record whether the value of the sink changes during
execution. If any modification of the source variables
value causes a change in the value of the sink while
following the same execution path, the source and sink
are considered a valid dataflow. This approach may
miss some dataflows, but provides a reasonably fair
basis for evaluation.
We focus the accuracy evaluation on dataflows
between the program inputs and branch constraints
because they ultimately determine the behavior of a
program, and because many security vulnerabilities in
a program can only be exploited when certain branches
are taken. We consider each byte in the input file to
be a taint source and each branch condition to be sink.
For each byte, we generate sample inputs by setting
the byte to 0, 255, and toggling each bit for a total
of 10 samples. We found that this sampling strategy
usually triggered a change in the sink variable when
there was a valid dataflow.
Accuracy evaluation. We perform the accuracy
evaluation on the programs shown in table I using
binary grsan grsan
Prec. Recall F1 Prec. Recall F1
minigzip 0.41 0.15 0.22 0.63 0.51 0.57
djpeg 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.83 0.69
mutool 0.87 0.50 0.63 0.86 0.51 0.64
xmllint 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.94 0.91 0.92
objdump 0.51 0.66 0.58 0.66 0.77 0.71
strip 0.42 0.72 0.53 0.50 0.86 0.63
size 0.54 0.76 0.63 0.62 0.91 0.74
TABLE III: Summary of precision comparison re-
sults for binary vs floating point gradient compar-
ison. Best F1 scores for each program are high-
lighted.
a set of small seed files (<1Kb) to make sampling
each byte feasible. Since the actual number of input
bytes with valid dataflows to a given branch might
be often very small compared to the total number of
input bytes, we use F1 accuracy as a performance
metric, which evaluates predictions on imbalanced
classes in classification problems. F1 accuracy is
computed as the harmonic mean of precision and
recall, F1 = 2 ∗ precision∗recallprecision+recall . Precision indicates the
proportion of bytes with predicted dataflows that are
correct (i.e. not false positives), while recall indicates
the proportion of valid dataflows that were correctly
predicted (i.e. not false negatives). Results are shown
in table II.
Generally, PGA achieves a significant improvement
in precision, achieving up a 37% increase in precision
and 33% increase in F1 accuracy compared to DFSan.
Overall PGA gets higher F1 scores for all programs.
Binary vs. floating point gradients. To measure
the importance of the gradient information to deter-
mining accurate dataflows, we perform an ablation
on gradients by limiting them to binary values. The
ablation uses the same proximal gradient propagation
rules, but rounds all gradients to 0 or 1 depending on
if they are nonzero, in effect converting PGA into
DTA with PGA propagation rules. Results of the
comparison are shown in table III. PGA with full
gradient information performs better than PGA with
binary gradients for every program, and in some cases,
such as minigzip, the large errors caused by limiting
the gradient to binary values render the dataflow
predictions almost completely invalid. The higher error
rates caused by binary gradients indicate that using
precise gradients that compose accurately over multiple
operations is key to the performance gains achieved
by PGA.
Zero gradient analysis. Overtainting is a serious
problem in DTA that creates many false positives
and causes excessive overhead. PGA is able to avoid
overtainting when it computes a zero gradient on an
instruction DTA would mark as tainted. Therefore we
investigate the distribution of zero gradients across
programs and instruction types to determine where
and how PGA is more precise than DTA.
For each program and each type of instruction, we
count how many times the instruction had zero gradient
in the execution traces from the accuracy evaluation.
The left hand side in table IV shows the results of this
analysis for each program.
We hypothesize that the programs that have the
largest differences in precision and recall will have
large numbers of zero gradients, while programs with
minimal differences will have very few zero gradients.
Generally, the counts of zero gradients support this
hypothesis. objdump, strip, and djpeg show larger
differences in accuracy between DTA and PGA. Con-
versely, xmllint also has a high ratio of zeros but has
a relatively smaller difference between dfsan and grsan.
We found that in this case many of the branch dataflow
effects we observed appeared to be caused by implicit
dataflow effects that both dfsan and grsan could not
detect.
We also examine which instructions are most likely
to have zero valued gradients across all programs. The
right side of table IV shows the top 7 instructions with
the most zero gradients. We find the instructions most
likely to have zero gradients are intuitively more likely
always have the same output. For example, right shifts
remove bytes from values, which often causes them
to output 0 regardless of their input. Similarly, And
and Mul operations will always output 0 if one of their
inputs is 0.
2) Overhead: We evaluate the overhead introduced
by our implementation of PGA next and compare it to
DataFlowSanitizer. To measure overhead, we execute
each program 5,000 times while recording runtime. We
perform each measurement 5 times and average the
measured runtime.
Table V shows the results of the overhead compari-
son. For each program, we compute the overhead of
DTA and PGA individually based on the DFSan and
GRSan implementations, as well as the relative overhead
of PGA compared to DTA. In the worst case PGA
has 21% greater overhead relative to DTA, but on
average only adds 2.8 % relative overhead. We also
provide overhead measurements for Libdft, although
it is significantly slower due to the overhead involved
Program Summary
Over all Instructions
Program Instrs %Zeros
minigzip 3012 28.2
djpeg 703 38.7
mutool 401 40.4
libxml 430 39.5
objdump 1070 39.0
strip 3089 41.0
size 659 19.3
Instruction Summary
Across all Programs
Instr. Total %Zeros
And 6756 30.2
URem 214 29.0
Sub 1214 21.0
Mul 875 15.9
LShr 2377 14.4
AShr 149 6.0
Add 895 5.7
TABLE IV: Analysis of operations from execution
traces where gradient drops to 0, aggregated for
each program and for each type of instruction
across all programs. Outputs of these operations
will have 0 gradient but still be marked as tainted
by DTA.
Program Libdft Dfsan Grsan Grsan rel.
Overhead Overhead Overhead to Dfsan
minigzip 2,379.5% 54.7% 61.5% 4.4%
djpeg - 70.5% 73.7% 1.9%
mupdf 853.5% 198.4% 262.1% 21.5%
xmllint 231.4% 5.5% 0.0% -5.2%
size 152.5% 101.1% 107.1% 3.0%
objdump 180.0% 133.2% 131.2% -0.9%
strip 142.5% 12.0% 11.4% -2.2%
TABLE V: Program overhead measurements aver-
aged over five runs. Libdft overhead is measured
relative to running a program only with PIN, DFsan
and GRsan are measured relative to uninstrumented
programs. Libdft programs ran in seconds to min-
utes, while DFsan and GRSan instrumented programs
ran in milliseconds. Libdft execution timed out on
djpeg after 6 hours. On average GRSan adds 3.22%
additional overhead relative to DFSan.
Instruction Taint (ns) Grad (ns) Increase
Add 0.075 0.082 9.33%
Mult 0.077 0.079 2.60%
Div 0.143 0.143 0.0%
And 0.076 0.083 9.21%
Shift 0.079 0.081 2.53%
Urem 0.144 0.144 0.0%
FAdd 0.076 0.080 5.26%
FMult 0.077 0.080 3.90%
FDiv 0.077 0.081 5.96%
TABLE VI: Average overhead for different types of
instructions measured over 100 billion executions.
GRSan adds 4.1% overhead relative to DFSan on
average.
in binary instrumentation.
Additionally, we perform microbenchmarks on indi-
vidual instructions that require gradient computation
to determine how much overhead PGA instrumentation
adds. For each instruction, we run a program that
executes it 100B times and compare measured CPU
time for taint and gradient instrumented versions of the
program. Table VI shows results for a representative
subset of operations. Generally PGA instrumentation
adds a small amount of overhead to each instruction
relative to taint tracking, with 9.33% in the worst case
on Add instructions, and 4.1% on average.
3) Dataflow-Guided Fuzzing: Since dynamic
dataflow analysis is often used as a tool to guide
fuzzing, we also evaluate PGA in comparison to DTA
as a method for guiding fuzzer mutations. Unlike
our evaluation of dataflow precision, this experiment
emphasizes the dataflow magnitude information
provided by the program gradient, since bytes with
the largest derivatives are selected for fuzzing.
Mutation Algorithm. We use the following proce-
dure to guide mutations: First, we execute the program
with all inputs set as sources and all branches set as
sinks. We then select 128 bytes from the input bytes
that have a nonzero gradient or taint value for at least
one branch. When selecting bytes with PGA, the bytes
with the greatest gradients are chosen first; while bytes
selected with DTA are chosen randomly. This approach
utilizes the additional information provided by PGA
to improve the mutation strategy.
The fuzzer performs a deterministic set of mutations
on the selected 128 bytes, in which each byte in
turn is set to all 256 possible values. We use this
simple strategy to ensure an unbiased comparison
of the information from gradient and taint. More
sophisticated strategies used by dataflow guided fuzzers
such as VUzzer or NEUZZ may achieve better coverage
but would likely bias the comparison between PGA
and DTA [37], [42], [54]. This strategy is summarized
in Appendix D.
Edge coverage comparison. We execute the fuzzer
with both PGA and DTA for 100,000 mutations, and
record coverage every 10,000 mutations. Figure 7
shows the relative edge coverage achieved by each
method over 100,000 mutations. On average the gra-
dient guided fuzzing outperforms taint in increasing
edge coverage by 10% per 10,000 mutations. The
gradient guided fuzzer achieves higher coverage on
all programs, with the greatest improvement in overall
edge coverage of 56% on strip. On other programs the
difference between gradient and taint guided fuzzing
is smaller: on minigzip and djpeg, the taint guided
fuzzer eventually closes the gap, while on objdump
there are relatively small differences. We hypothesize
that the taint guided fuzzing is able to eventually reach
to a similar level of edge coverage on minigzip and
djpeg because they are relatively simple programs.
We also note that for some programs such as xmllint,
there is a significant disparity between the results of the
guided fuzzing and precision evaluations. We believe
this difference is caused by two factors: the magnitude
of the gradient was more important than its accuracy
in guiding the fuzzer on these programs, and that even
small differences in accuracy can be significant if they
allow the fuzzer to precisely target key branches in the
program.
C. Bug Finding
Next, we show the additional information provided
by PGA makes it very effective for discovering and
analyzing different types of bugs in real world programs.
We test PGA in three applications: detecting and
analyzing known vulnerabilities, guiding discovery of
new vulnerabilities, and discovering information leaks.
1) Analysis of known CVEs: We first evaluate
PGA as a tool for detecting and analyzing dangerous
dataflows in known CVEs. To detect these dataflows,
we instrument the programs so that the gradients of in-
struction operands involved in the attacks are recorded.
We select 9 CVEs that cover a range of vulnerability
types in our evaluation programs, including stack and
heap overflows, integer overflows, memory allocation
errors, and null pointer dereferences. As shown in table
VII, PGA can detect and trace the relevant dataflows
in these CVEs.
Additionally, we show PGA can trace dataflows for
several CVEs that DTA cannot. In the case of CVE-
2018-11214 and CVE-2018-11212, overtainting on the
inputs that trigger the error causes DataFlowSanitizer
to run out of labels and crash, while PGA is able
to precisely identify the relevant dataflows without
overtainting. In the case of CVE-2017-15996, an out
of memory allocation error triggered by the dataflow
from an input byte, PGA can predict by how much the
memory allocation size will change with respect to the
input byte and is thus able to correctly identify which
input byte values will trigger the out-of-memory error.
In contrast, DTA can identify the dataflow but cannot
predict the rate of change of the memory allocation and
CVE ID Vulnerability - Program PGA DTA
CVE-2007-1657 stack overflow - minigzip X X
CVE-2017-7210 off-by-one read - objdump X X
CVE-2018-6759 null pointer dereference - nm X X
CVE-2018-10372 heap overflow - readelf X X
CVE-2018-19932 integer overflow - strip X X
CVE-2018-19777 infinite loop - mutool X X
CVE-2017-15996 out-of-memory - readelf X ×
CVE-2018-11214 heap overflow - cjpeg X ×
CVE-2018-11212 divide-by-zero - cjpeg X ×
TABLE VII: List of CVEs for which the exploitable
dataflows were detected by PGA and DTA (dfsan
and libdft)
thus cannot distinguish between an input byte value
triggering a vulnerable or normal program execution.
2) Bug Discovery: After evaluating PGA as a tool
for detecting known attacks, we next evaluate the
utility of PGA in discovering new bugs in programs.
To do so we add additional instrumentation to record
gradients for instruction and function arguments that
can potentially trigger program errors, such as memory
allocations, copy instructions, indexing operations,
and shift operators. We then execute the programs
on a corpus of files generated by running AFL on
each program for 24 hours, as well as a selection of
files generated from other programs to further extend
coverage. For each file, if any input bytes have a
nonzero derivative with an instrumented function, we
generate new inputs using the function gradient as a
guide. For most functions we generate inputs setting
the bytes with a gradient to either 0 or 255, although
for instructions that can potentially trigger a division
by 0 we also search all possible values.
Table VIII summarizes our results. Overall we find
23 bugs in our evaluated programs, including arith-
metic errors, out-of-memory allocations, and integer
overflows. Figure 8 illustrates how large gradients
are used to find an arithmetic error in djpeg. By
altering an input byte with a large gradient to a
shift operand, an overflow is triggered that results
in an invalid operation. Similarly, identifying inputs
with large gradients to memory operations was key
to finding memory errors. We are in contact with
developers of these programs to fix the issues discovered
with PGA.
3) Information Leak Discovery: Finally, we inves-
tigate PGA’s potential utility in finding side channel
information leaks. Side channel leaks often occur when
an amplification effect is present, such that small
changes to an internal program value cause large
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Fig. 7: Comparison of guided fuzzer edge coverage achieved by PGA and DTA over 100k mutations from
a single seed. Overall gradient-guided fuzzing achieves up to 56% higher coverage and improves the rate
of new edge discovery by 10% on average.
1 INPUT_BYTE (cinfo , &c);
2
3 GRSAN_MARK_BYTE (c, 1.0);
4 /* c marked with gradient 1.0 */
5
6 cinfo ->Al = (c) & 15;
7 /* cinfo ->Al gradient = 1.0 */
8
9 ...
10
11 (* block )[ natural_order [k]] =
12 ( JCOEF ) (v << cinfo ->Al );
13 /* block [0] gradient = 8.0 */
14
15
16 void jpeg_idct_islow (int * block )
17 {
18 ...
19 int * inptr = block ;
20 /* inptr [0] gradient = 8.0 */
21
22 z2 = (int) inptr [0] * quantptr [0]
23 /* z2 gradient = 2040.0 can overflow */
24
25 z2 = z2 << 13;
26 /* negative z2 triggers error */
27 ...
28 }
Fig. 8: Arithmetic Error in djpeg.
Integer Memory
Library Test Program Overflow Corruption
libjpeg-9c djpeg 2 3
mupdf-1.14.0 mutool show 1 0
binutils-2.30 size 0 1
objdump -xD 0 9
strip 0 7
TABLE VIII: Summary of new vulnerabilities found
by PGA. In total there are 23 new vulnerabilities
found over 5 programs.
changes in the program behavior that can be observed
externally. Prior work has shown that by correlating
a set of known inputs with external measurements,
it is possible to leak information about other user’s
private inputs to a program [10]. PGA is well suited to
detecting the amplification effects associated with these
side channels, since operations that cause large changes
to program behavior typically have large gradients.
We provide two case studies to demonstrate how
PGA can be used to detect side channel leaks: one
example of a side channel leak in memory usage in
objdump and one example of a leak in execution time in
cjpeg. To identify each leak, we marked the input file
headers as sources and relevant program values as sinks,
either memory allocation operands for memory side
channels or comparison operands in loops for execution
time side channels.
Gradient magnitude was key to identifying the
memory based side channel in objdump, which had
a gradient of 1 million to a malloc instruction from
the ELF section header for program size. Figure 9a
shows the effect of incrementing the value from 46 to
59 on the program’s total memory usage. The memory
consumption is linear in the byte value if the byte is
in range from 48 to 57, which can be converted to a
valid number ’0’ to ’9’ in ASCII. For byte values out
of this range, the memory consumption drop sharply
to 7K bytes.
The timing side-channel in cjpeg was identified by
a non-zero gradient from the height field in the jpeg
header to the operand of a while loop condition. Figure
9b illustrates the effect of incrementing the field value
on the program execution time.
While information leaks like ELF file size and JPEG
file dimensions may seem harmless at first glance,
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Fig. 9: Memory and timing side channel leaks
prior side channel attacks have demonstrated that
these types of leaks can be exploited to learn sensitive
information about a user [24]. For example, one can
imagine a malicious Android app that uses JPEG
dimensions leaked from a browser to determine which
websites the device user is visiting.
VI. Related Work
Dynamic Taint Analysis. Dynamic Taint Analysis
(DTA) tracks data flow from taint sources to taint
sinks at runtime. Common applications of DTA include
software vulnerability analysis and information leak
detection [33], [53], [14], [17], [54]. DTA typically
overestimates the tainted bytes which contribute to a
large performance overhead. Therefore, much of the
recent work in DTA has focused on developing more
efficient systems [25], [6], [29]. PGA is similar to DTA
in that it dynamically propagates dataflow information
through a program, but provides more fine-grained
information in the form of gradients. Moreover, PGA
is more precise than DTA, which reduces overtainting
in large programs.
Some DTA systems use bit level taint tracking to
improve precision at the cost of higher overheads [51],
[50]. Although we have not implemented it in our cur-
rent prototype, gradients can also be propagated over
individual bits based on functional boolean analysis,
and we expect it to offer similar tradeoffs in improved
accuracy for higher overheads [34].
Recently, automatically learning taint rules has been
used to reduce the approximation errors in DTA [11].
This approach is orthogonal to ours and could also
potentially be applied to learn gradient propagation
rules, especially for the functions with large Lipschitz
constants in new architectures.
Quantitative Information Flow. Quantitative In-
formation Flow (QIF) measures the potential transmis-
sion of information through a program using entropy
based measures such as channel capacity and min-
entropy [28], [47], [18]. QIF has primarily been used for
detecting information leaks and ensuring the integrity
of program secrets [23], [2], [16], but has also been
proposed as a way of enhancing taint tracking [32].
PGA adds a different type of information in the form
of gradients, and does not have the high computational
complexity involved in estimating information flows
accurately.
Gradient-guided fuzzing. Two recent fuzzers have
used gradient approximations to guide their mutation
process. Angora estimates finite differences, an ap-
proximation of gradients with many known limitations
especially for high-dimensional problems, by executing
the program on modified inputs and recording the
changes in the outputs [9], [38]. NEUZZ incorporates a
neural network that predicts program branch behavior
and then uses the gradient of that network to guide
its mutations [42]. Neutaint is concurrent work
that further develops this approach by using neural
networks specifically to approximate data flows [41].
This incurs less overhead than instrumentation based
methods but is also less exact since it operates on an
approximate model of the program. By contrast, PGA
computes gradients directly over individual instruc-
tions on the entire program and therefore produces
precise gradients.
Program Smoothing. Prior work has explored
smooth interpretation of a program as another ap-
proach to computing gradients by applying Gaussian
smoothing to derive a differentiable program approxi-
mation [7], [8]. These methods use symbolic reasoning
on static programs to compute their approximations
and do not scale to large programs. PGA’s approxima-
tion methods are more efficient and scale to real world
programs.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper we introduce proximal gradient
analysis (PGA), a novel theoretically-grounded
approach to measuring influence in a program that
uses non-smooth calculus techniques to compute
gradients over programs. PGA is more precise than
dynamic taint tracking and provides more fine grained
information about program behavior. We provide a
prototype implementation of PGA based on the LLVM
framework and show that it outperforms LLVM’s DTA
implementation and libdft in accuracy and guided
fuzzing while adding less than 5% overhead on average.
Finally, we show gradient analysis is an effective
tool for bug finding, detecting 9 different CVEs, 23
previously unknown bugs, and 2 side-channel leaks in
7 real world programs. We hope that our approach to
program analysis will motivate other researchers to
explore new techniques exploiting the rich non-smooth
analysis literature.
We are currently in the process of notifying the
developers of the affected programs. Please treat
the bugs as confidential and do not disclose any
information about them.
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Appendix A
Derivation of Bounded Proximal Gradient
Sampling bounds for proximal gradients are derived
from two observations. First, by definition, the cost
function of the proximal operator at y = proxf (x)
must be less than or equal to the cost function’s value
at x. This follows directly from the definition of the
proximal operator, as it returns a point near x that
minimizes the cost function relative to x, leading to:
f (y) + 12 ||y − x||22 ≤ f (x)
Where || · ||2 refers to Euclidean Distance. Second,
the maximum possible difference between f (y) and
f (x) is bounded by the Lipschitz Constant K. Hence,
the minimum value f can take with ||y− x||2 distance
away from x is f (x) −K ∗ ||y − x||2 which is upper
bounded by f(y).
f (x)−K ∗ ||y − x||2 + 12 ||y − x||22
≤ f (y) + 12 ||y − x||22
≤ f (x)
This inequality can be simplified by dropping the
middle term as well as subtracting f (x) from both
sides:
−K ∗ ||y − x||2 + 12 ||y − x||22 ≤ 0
Adding K ∗ ||y−x||2 to both sides, dividing by ||y−
x||, and multiplying by 2 gives a bound of 2K on the
distance between the initial point x and the proximal
operator result y. We substitute y with proxf (x) for
the final result.
||proxf (x)− x||2 ≤ 2K (8)
This result means that the distance between the
result of the proximal operator and its initial value x
is bounded by at most twice the Lipschitz Constant of
the function, 2K. We then define the bounded proximal
gradient as
prox∇f (x,K) =
f (x)− f (proxf (x,K))
x− proxf (x,K) (9)
where K is the Lipschitz Constant of the evaluated
function f . This definition of the proximal gradient
allows us to determine the exact amount of sampling
required to prevent errors when the Lipschitz Constant
is known. Fortunately, it is possible to determine the
Lipschitz Constants for most operations in programs
when these constants for the input operands are
known. We therefore include Lipschitz Constants in
the gradient propagation rules we define for operations
in programs.
Appendix B
Methods for Computing Branch Gradients
Although our current prototype implementation
does not take branches into account, we describe two
possible approaches to handling branches with PGA
here for completeness.
Barrier functions provide a means to attenuate
gradients that are likely to be incorrect because they
would change the current execution path. For example,
on the path if(x<8) x=x&4; if x=7 initially, sampling
x=8 for x=x&4; would yield a gradient of -4. However,
this gradient would be invalid because x=8 would follow
a different execution path and skip the x=x&4 operation.
A barrier function on branch if (x<8) could set the
positive gradient of x to 0 such that the proximal
gradient would not sample invalid values.
Sampling alternate execution paths is another pos-
sible approach to handling branches that could poten-
tially be used to model implicit data flows. For example,
upon encountering the branch if(x<1)y=0;else y=1;
with the value x=0, analysis could fork execution and
set x=1 to observe how the alternate execution effects
the value of y. This could then be used to estimate a
gradient of y with regard to x, even though x has no
direct effect on y.
Appendix C
Gradient Instrumentation Code Sample
Figure 10 shows a sample of the instrumentation
for propagating gradients over two Mul and And
operations. The Mul operation gradient can be com-
puted analytically, while the And operation requires
sampling.
1 /* use chain rule to compute gradient
2 for MULTIPLICATION operation */
3 case 15:
4 neg_gr = x1 * neg_gr2 + x2 * neg_gr1 ;
5 pos_gr = x1 * pos_gr2 + x2 * pos_gr1 ;
6 break ;
7 ...
8 /* use sampling to approximate gradient
9 for binary AND operation */
10 case 26:
11 y = x1 & x2;
12 for (s =1... NSAMPLES ) {
13 neg_y = (x1 - s * neg_gr1 )
14 & (x2 - s * neg_gr2 );
15 /* use nearest nonzero negative
16 directional derivative */
17 if ( neg_gr == 0)
18 neg_gr = (y - neg_y )/s;
19
20 pos_y = (x1 + s * pos_gr1 )
21 & (x2 + s * pos_gr2 );
22 /* use nearest nonzero positive
23 directional derivative */
24 if ( pos_gr == 0)
25 pos_gr = ( pos_y - y)/s;
26 }
27 break ;
28 ...
Fig. 10: Simplified sample of gradient computation
with both analytic integer multiplication and sam-
pling bitwise And operation as examples.
Appendix D
Fuzzing Comparison Mutation Algorithm
Algorithm 1 formally defines the mutation strategy
used in the guided fuzzing evaluation in section V-B3.
Algorithm 1 Simple mutation algorithm for
dataflow-guided fuzzing that focuses on influ-
ential bytes.
Input: k ← select k influential bytes
seed ← initial seed
program ← targeted program
total_mut ← number of mutations
1: while cur_mutations < total_mutations do
2: influential_bytes← program(seed)
3: for byte ∈ influential_bytes do
4: for v = 1 to 255 do
5: gen_mutate(seed, byte, v)
6: cur_mutations← cur_mutations+ 1
7: end for
8: end for
9: end while
